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ABSTRACT
This thesis demonstrates the use of Janus in modeling
Military Operations Other Than War, MOOTW. Janus has many
uses throughout the United States military. Lately, MOOTW
have become a major percentage of the U.S. military's
efforts. Using Janus to model these operations can help
predict casualties, determine if new pieces of equipment
make a difference in the operation, and help evaluate "what
ifs" in operations. More importantly, conducting a
simulation before carrying out an actual exercise saves
money and people's time and effort. The threat of a
terrorist chemical attack is a very likely event in this day
and age as demonstrated by the 1995 chemical attack in a
Japanese subway. Current U.S. policy has allocated certain
resources to assist local governments in the event of an
emergency. Unfortunately, these assets can nor immediately
respond to a chemical crisis. Time waiting for these assets
to arrive must be spent wisely to save lives. Local
governments do not all have the same capabilities available
to respond to a chemical attack. Using a high resolution
combat model such as Janus at the local level will help
determine assets that will save lives and money.
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The purpose of this thesis is to assist local
governments in crisis management by showing the capabilities
of a high-resolution combat simulation to model Military
Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) . Because responding to
terrorism within the United States is an example of MOOTW,
developing the model can also simulate local community
actions. The community assets will be the first to respond
to the crisis, and therefore local governments must be




The threat of a chemical terrorist attack in a
populated area is a very real danger to the United States as
well as the rest of the world. According to A National
Security Strategy for A New Century, [Ref. 1], because of
the United States' military and weapons superiority, other
nations or terrorist groups may resort to terrorist acts
against unsuspecting civilian targets instead of
conventional military operations. With today's advanced
information technology, terrorists have the ability to
collect information rapidly, communicate freely, and gather
materials needed to produce chemical weapons. In the past
years, two examples have shown the need for the United
States to develop and implement resources to deter this
threat. On March 20, 1995 a terrorist group used Sarin gas
in the Tokyo subway killing twelve and injuring more than
5,000 people [Ref. 2]. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the
Murrah Federal Building shows that terrorism is not just a
major city problem, but can happen anywhere and at anytime.
These two events show just how vulnerable the United States
and the world are to a terrorist attack and chemical
weapons
.
One of America's reportedly best prepared cities to
deal with terrorist attacks, New York City, conducted an
exercise similar to the Tokyo subway gassing on April 11,
1995. The results of this no notice exercise were alarming.
Not properly assessing the nature of the emergency, fire and
rescue personnel responding to the scene became casualties
themselves because they did not don their protective masks
and protective clothing before rushing to the aid of the
victims. On December 7, 1995 in Burbank California, a
simulated release of a nerve agent in a hotel revealed the
same results. There were 300 dead and 500 injured in this
training exercise. According to a News Advisory
,
[Ref. 2],
published by the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation Project; if chemical agents were used in
the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the
20,000 people in the building would have been incapacitated
within three minutes and dead within six minutes. The
accuracy of this statement depends on many factors that are
not discussed at this time, bur the statement does show
what could happen if such weapons were deployed.
Having seen the need for legislation dealing with
America' s preparation to defend against and defeat a
terrorist chemical attack, the Domestic Preparedness
Initiative (Public Law 104-201, September 23, 1996) was
created. This law is commonly called the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
legislation. This law provides funding for the Department of
Defense (DOD) to assist the ability of federal, state, and
local emergency workers (first responders) in incidents
involving chemical terrorism. Public awareness is the first
step in preparing for a chemical attack. Civilians must
learn to identify the symptoms the human body experiences
during a chemical attack. Not only will this save lives,
but also help the initial emergency crews arriving at the
location to have a better grasp of the situation and not
become casualties themselves. One of the initiatives from
this law was to introduce training programs designed to
enhance the public's awareness of chemical weapons and
identifying chemical symptoms. Another tool designed to
increase awareness is classes designed for city mayors and
their councils. The classes will help develop awareness and
decision making skills to handle a chemical attack.
Unfortunately, making the public aware is a difficult task.
Many people find it hard to conceive that a terrorist attack
could happen in their city or if it did, that the attack
could not be quickly repelled.
Recently, several agencies have formed a union to
execute the Domestic Preparedness Program developed by the
Department of Defense in 1996. One of the missions of this
program is to develop first responder abilities to react to
Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) terrorism. To accomplish
this mission, training and mock exercises will occur in 27
cities with a goal of training 120 cities during the next
three years [Ref. 3]. Other assets to assist in a terrorist
chemical attack are being developed under the Department of
Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve
Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of
Mass Destruction published in January 1998, [Ref. 4]. This
plan calls for the development of Rapid Assessment and
Initial Detection (RAID) elements in each state or
territory. These teams will provide the major capability for
the technical Department of Defense support. Some of the
likely tasks that the RAID elements will assist first
responders are early assessment and detection of a chemical
agent, determining the concentration of the release, and
determining the areas to evacuate. The goal is for the first
element of the RAID team, the reconnaissance element, to be
on site not later than four hours after the reguest for help
is issued. [Ref . 4] This is a major issue, and possibly not
achievable, since not all team members will be full-time
members of the National Guard or Reserve unit.
Regretfully, many lives can be lost within a four-hour
window. In most cases the city and county resources will be
the only available assets to respond immediately to a
chemical attack when life or death could possibly be a
difference of only a matter of minutes. As expected,
resources and funding for personnel, training, and equipment
are different in each city. Larger cities have larger
budgets, and more equipment than smaller cities. The more
probable the attack in an area, the more personnel they have
trained. Again, as shown in the Oklahoma City bombing,
terrorist attacks are not predictable and not just targeted
against the world's largest populated areas. Small cities
with large tourist populations or locations with a large
work time population are possibly as an attractive target
to a terrorist as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or any
other large metropolis. Maybe these smaller areas are even
more of a target since the element of surprise of a chemical
attack, and fewer assets and trained personnel to handle the
situation would be expected. Because of the unpredictability
of a terrorist attack all first responders must train and
practice as much as possible. Experience has to be gained
in order to achieve confidence in their matter of life or
death decision-making skills. Simulations offer a monetarily
cheap way to test a city's plan for responding to a chemical
attack, and to help acquire priceless experience in
decision-making skills.
C. JANUS MODEL
Janus is used primarily as an Army wargaming simulation
10 model brigade and below sized operations. It was
initially used as a nuclear effects simulation model by the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory of the University of
California. Janus is a high resolution, interactive, closed,
stochastic, combat wargaming simulation designed to
analytically study doctrine, strategy, and weapon system
development. Closed means the location of the opposing side
is hidden to the other side until a system under that side's
control detects the other sides system. [Ref. 5] This makes
the user search and find casualties within an area giving
the model a more accurate portrayal of what would actually
happen in an emergency operation. The major advantage of
Janus is the interaction allowed between the user and the
model. The user can make real-time changes in the simulation
at any time. This allows the user to see the effects on an
operation if it is conducted one way or another. It can also
be used non-interactively . This has advantages because it
reduces the variance of human decisions made during the
exercise. Another advantage of Janus is the ability to
create and move icons on actual terrain. The simulation uses
digitized terrain from the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) to display elevation and vegetation. Different
types of roads, buildings, and cities can also be added so
the operator' s simulation is as accurate to the actual
terrain as possible. Because the terrain and urban
characteristics of the area are represented within the
model, Janus can realistically model movement and
visibility. Icons such as victims, fire engines, ambulances,
and police vehicles can be added to represent the different
participants in the exercise.
As mentioned earlier, Janus primarily simulates force-
on-force military operations, but can pay major dividends in
helping analyze Military Operations Other Than War. Even
though Janus has limited chemical play, the imagination is
the only hurdle in what can be modeled and analyzed. Janus
can be used to compare different routes to see which is
fastest and how much transportation is needed to most
effectively transport casualties. Additionally, questions
such as
:
• What would happen if a chemical attack occurred at a
different location instead of the one expected?
• What would happen if a larger or smaller amount of
chemical were used?
These questions can be answered as well as others. The most
important advantage of Janus to simulate a chemical attack-
is its outcome determination capability. This can help
medical personnel and hospitals anticipate what they can
expect if such an emergency occurred. Also, the simulation
can help everyone visualize the total area that would be
considered contaminated, and how many people would have to
be evacuated. Janus currently is not available in a
personal computer program due to the large demand it places
on system resource requirements. However, because Janus is
used extensively in the Army and Marine Corps, it is
available to many communities where other chemical models
are not. Enormous benefits would be gained if the military
allowed the civilian population access to Janus. If local
communities were allowed access to Janus, more community
leaders could gain experience through the simulation.
Finally, simulations have the potential to save a large
amount of money and time. This saving could then be spent on
more equipment and training needed to prepare for a chemical
incident
.
D. HAZARD PREDICTION AND ASSESSMENT CAPABILTY MODEL
(HPAC)
Because of Janus' limited chemical capability, another
model's output will be used to supplement this thesis'
scenario. HPAC provides a model that can produce an area of
the chemical spread based on the historical weather and
terrain data of the targeted location. The Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, (DTRA) is the proponent of this model.
DTRA was formerly known as DSWA, Defense Special Weapons
Agency. HPAC can also predict the expected number of
casualties within the contaminated area. [Ref. 6] Figure 1
displays a typical output from the HPAC model. The legend in
figure 1 displays the expected number of victims for a
certain dosage amount. Also, from the graph we can determine
where the expected amounts of the chemical will spread
within the area. From the graph, the large area represents
the threshold amount of the chemical, 1 mg-min/nr. The
smallest oval represents an area where a person would
receive a lethal dosage over 100 mg-min/nr. Dosage rates
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II. Using HPAC's
output strengthens the accuracy of the Janus model. We have
valid patterns of the chemical dissipation based on
historical weather data. Without this feature, we would
have to rely on Janus, which does not allow as many weather
factors to be considered.
Terrorist Attack at Monterey, CA, Bus Station
0.5kg Sarin Released @ 1m HOB, Predictive Wx, 60% Dissem Eff
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Figure 1. Output from HPAC Model
Having determined the need for a local community
response model, we develop a model to solve specific
questions of the local response to a chemical attack asked
in this chapter. In Chapter II we discuss how we develop a
terrorist scenario. Chapter III discusses how we incorporate
10
the terrorist model into a high resolution model. In Chapter
IV we analyze the model's output in an attempt to answer
certain questions about the problem. Lastly, in Chapter V we
make conclusions and recommendations about how to handle
such a horrible event.
11
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II. TERRORIST SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT
A. SCENARIO OVERVIEW
Realizing that state and federal assets are not
expected to arrive at the site of the emergency until four
hours after the chemical release is identified, the local
emergency response team should establish a generic timeline
for planning purposes. This helps all participants in the
exercise understand how the local civil emergency response
system works and what each participant' s role is in the
operation. Using the baseline exercise conducted in Pacific
Grove, California, [Ref. 7], and discussing the problem with
local officials and first responders; the following generic
timeline was developed for the model.
Sequence Start
Time
Action Finish Time Notes
Event 1 H-hour Chemical
released
H+ 10 min

















Event 5A H+40 min Extricate and Rate is 30 sec - 2 rescue
initial per person personnel
triage of (non-serious )
.
required for
causalities Move as group
add 2 min from
last victim.
Serious rate


















Event 5B H+4 min Hasty Decon
site est.
H+60 min - Need rescue
personnel 12






H +7 min -Ensure extra
atropine on
site .
Event 7 H+60 min Start Decon Standard is 12
per hour.
3 per 15 min
Event 8 H+7 5 min Move victims Until -Ensure








Event 8 Chemical most
likely
dissipated






Event 9 Con' t EVAC,
Chemical
Decon





Table 1. Generic Response Timeline for City Actions in a
Chemical Attack "After Ref. [7]"
This timeline will serve as the basis for the even:
scheduling of the simulation. Since events in an actual
exercise have many human factors involved with the sequence
of events, the times serve as an event driver for the
scenario and should be considered flexible for an actual
event. The times and actions of the simulation represent the
ideal performance by players in the scenario. Having the
players use a different set of parameters and assumptions to
exercise decision-making and training techniques would
represent actual performance. For example, if firefighters
had to search a larger area for victims because they did not
know the exact radius of the chemical attack, the reaction-
times would be slower. In this study the intent was to base
the timeline on the most accurate set of parameters and
assumptions possible so most of the times are those
presented in Reference 7. The chemical event times were
derived from current chemical publications in conjunction
with local first response leaders, [Ref. 19]. The modeling
of these times will be discussed in detail in Chapter III.
Having established a general timeline to follow, the
scenario begins with the initial chemical attack. Once the
fire department and HAZMAT team have identified and
confirmed that an attack in fact occurred, casualties are
collected and taken to a decon site for decontamination.
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Using values from the established timeline, more emergency
assets arrive and assist in the operation. Casualties are
moved to the hospital once they have been decontaminated.
For this simulation the contaminated area is known
precisely. This means the emergency workers know exactly the
radius of the chemical spread due to the wind and weather.
This represents the best case scenario for determining
casualties and where emergency assets are needed. Taking
advantage of the "closed" attribute, the simulation can
provide variations of the chemical dispersal to allow the
participants to practice their decision-making skills. This
adds a significant learning capability for the participants
since not all communities have the same amount of chemical
emergency training. Conducting the simulation can help
visualize the "Hot Zone", the suspected contaminated area,
to first responders and local authorities who have never
experienced such an event. Also, the simulation helps
quantify how many assets are needed to evacuate personnel
within the contaminated area. The decision-making
experience gained from the simulation should reduce the time
and effort of the first responders in a real emergency. For
example, first responders should develop and train ways not
to waste time trying to evacuate a larger non-contaminated
area versus identifying and evacuating the actual
16
contaminated area. Time could then be minimized in a real
emergency and hence reduce the number of casualties.
When the primary hospital used in this scenario has
reached its maximum caring capacity for patients, additional
patients will be taken by ground transportation to adjacent
hospitals. Helicopters could be used if the situation
dictates. One major drawback in using helicopters within the
vicinity of a chemical area is that their rotor blades have
the ability to spread the chemical by creating gusts of
wind.
B. DEFINITION OF TERMS
Before discussing the specific chemical used in the
simulation, certain terms must be defined. For more
information on the subjects than what is provided refer to
the noted references.
1 . Classification of Chemical Agents
Chemical agents can be classified by their physical
state, physiological action, or use. For example, a chemical
agent's physical state is a gas, liquid, or solid. Some
examples of classifying agents by their physiological action
are as choking agents, nerve agents, or blood agents.
Lastly, agents can be classified by their use as either
toxic or incapacitating. Toxic agents can cause death or
serious injury. Incapacitating agents cause physiological
17
or mental effects that can last for hours or days. [Ref . 8:
p. 4]
2. Factors Determining Effectiveness of Chemical
Agents
Some factors that determine how long a chemical agent
remains effective are weather, terrain, structures, method
of dissipation, and physical properties of the agent.
Temperature, wind speed, relative humidity, temperature
gradient, and precipitation are the major weather conditions
that effect chemical agents. For this simulation all weather
factors were determined from historical data for the modeled
Monterey area. Because of this, the author will not go into
great detail on how weather conditions effect chemical
agent's effectiveness. The reader can refer to Reference 9
for a more in depth discussion.
How the chemical agent is disseminated also plays a
role in the effectiveness of the agent. Vapors do not last
in an area as long as a liquid would. Physical properties
such as vapor pressure and volatility determine the rate of
evaporation of a chemical. Gases tend to disperse quickly
after release presenting a short-term hazard whereas a
liquid will most likely have a longer effect. [Ref. 10:p.5]
Vegetation, soil, and elevation of the terrain also
contribute to the effectiveness of a chemical agent.
Because this simulation occurs in an urban area, the terrain
factors do not necessary apply. Urban areas can raise the
temperature gradient of a chemical because of the enclosed
asphalt and concrete area. Buildings can channel the
chemical dispersion by blocking airflow and adjusting wind
currents. These are just some the effects that first
responders must handle when dealing with a chemical attack
within an urban area.
3. How Chemicals enter the Body and Dosage Levels.
There are many ways that a chemical agent can enter the
body. Gases can be inhaled by any part of the respiratory
tract from either the nose or lungs. The eyes, lungs, skin
and especially areas of the skin where sweating is present
absorb gases quickly. Wounds present an easy opportunity for
a chemical agent to enter the body. Chemicals can be
ingested from contaminated food or liquids. The effects of a
chemical agent on the body can vary depending upon how nhe
chemical was induced into the body and the amount of
exposure
.
The dose of a chemical is absorbed into the body is
usually expressed in milligrams per kilogram (mg/kg) of body
weight. When dealing with a chemical in a gaseous state, the
two most common ways of discussing the dosage is the Median
Lethal Dosage (LCt~ ) and the Median Incapacitating Dosage
(let,,) . The Median Lethal Dosage (LCt 50 ) is defined as, "the
19
dosage from a vapor or aerosol that is lethal to 50 percent
of exposed, unprotected personnel at some given breathing
rate."[Ref. 8:p.9] The Median Incapacitating Dosage (Ictso)
is defined as, "the amount of inhaled vapor that is
sufficient to disable 50 percent of exposed, unprotected
personnel"
.
[Ref . 8:p.9] The unit of measure to express these
dosages is mg-min/nr . This unit of measure is based upon the
amount of the chemical in the air for a certain time divided
by the area of the exposure. Dosages can be expressed using
other measures. LCt 9 o is the dosage of a vapor that would
kill 90 percent of exposed, unprotected personnel.
As with every unit of measure there are human factors
that affect the manifestation of chemical poisoning
symptoms. A person's rate of breathing or what activity the
person was doing at the time of the exposure are a few such
examples. Because the body has the ability to detoxify over
time, the individual's body composition can also vary the
actual dose that a person receives. In this study, these
variables are not explicitly examined. The dosage values are
based upon the amount of the agent a person receives
breathing at a rate of 15 liters per minute conducting light
activity. Examples of light activity are sitting on a bench
outside talking, or doing deskwork. The Chemical toxin, (Ct)
20
dosage also assumes a 70-kilogram person in a moderate
climate with average humidity. [Ref. 8:p.9]
C . TREATMENT
As mentioned above, the body can detoxify certain
chemical agents. Unfortunately, most agents have cumulative
effects. This means that exposure to a very small
concentration of a chemical, can cause death if the person
remains in the exposed area for a sufficient period. Another
case might be if the exposed person moves to an unexposed
area and then receives another non-lethal dosage, the
combined effect might be sufficient to kill him. An
additional factor that makes treatment of a chemical attack
difficult to manage is that the rate at which the chemical
symptoms are displayed vary depending upon the chemical
used. For example, blister agents can take up to 10-12 days
before symptoms appear. [Ref. 8]
Nerve agents as played in this study display symptoms
almost immediately. Death can occur within 15 minutes of
exposure. To prevent this, antidotes must be administered
within minutes of a person receiving the lethal dosage of an
agent. Antidotes for a nerve agent are atropine and 2-PAM
chloride. 2-PAM re-stimulates the enymze
acetylcholinesterase (AchE) . AchE prevents the accumulation
of acetylcholine after its release in the nervous system.
21
Acetylcholine is needed for voluntary muscles and nerve
endings of the autonomic system and many structures within
the central nervous system. Atropine blocks acetylcholine
preventing its build-up in the nervous system. [Ref. 8]
D . SARIN
The nerve agent sarin was used for this study. Nerve
agents are the most useful to terrorists because only small
amounts are needed to cause a substantial number of
casualties. Sarin was the chemical used in the Tokyo Subway
attack. Sarin (also known as GB, chemical name isopropyl
methylphosphanofluoridate) is a colorless and ordorless
liquid. G. Shrader discovered it in Germany in 1939. The
chemical can be synthesized by a moderately competent
organic chemist, with limited laboratory facilities . [Ref
.
10] It is estimated the cost per casualty using a nerve
agent is approximately $600 dollars. Sarin is most rapidly
absorbed through the respiratory system. Absorption through
contact with the skin or eyes can still cause problems to
the individual, but the absorption is slower except at
higher environmental temperatures. Different symptoms of
exposure to the chemical result depending on the
concentration level. At a low concentration level the
symptoms are: headaches, increased salivation, increased
nasal secretion, constricting of the pupils, and trouble
22
breathing. At a high level of concentration the symptoms
are: coughing, greater difficulty breathing, increased
perspiration, nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and effects on the
muscular system. Death occurs by suffocation due to effects
on respiratory musculature and respiratory center in the
central nervous system. [Ref. 11]
As a nerve agent, sarin has a very rapid rate of
action. Death can occur within 15 minutes of the lethal
dosage. The body has an extremely low rate of detoxification
for this agent; therefore, sarin's effects are considered
cumulative. The LCt 50 respiratory dosage is 100 mg-min/rrr
resting and 70 mg-min/rrr' being mildly active. The minimum
effect of the chemical is shown at 1 mg-min/m 3 . Another
interesting fact about nerve agents is that clothing exposed
to the agents radiates the effects for 30 minutes after
contact with the vapor. If exposed to sarin, one should
immediately flush the eyes with water and decontaminate
clothing using a bleach substance such as typical household
bleach. In most cases sarin will dissipate from an exposed
area within a couple of days. [Ref. 8]
In summary, forming the initial timeline will establish
the time sequencing for our scenario development. We must
however be cognizant of sarin's rapid effects on the body.
Also, understanding what other factors induce change on the
23
chemical spread must be taken into account. Having an
understanding of how chemicals enter the body and what
factors effect the spread of chemicals in mind, we move





The goal in any model is 10 create a simulation that
accurately portrays what is suppose to happen and analyze
possible future events. Because many parameters have not
been established, or they change frequently during a
chemical attack, this task initially appears difficult.
Taking a second look at the problem, we realize that if we
use established parameters with sound assumptions the
problem is quite simple. Also, we can use the information we
gain in the Janus simulation to establish undetermined
parameters that will help maximize time, personnel, and
equipment in the event of a real terrorist chemical
emergency. We will use the initial timeline as our baseline
for the model. As mentioned earlier, established parameters
are from the Pacific Grove, CA exercise and current chemical
references defining response times for chemical actions.
Assumptions are made based on modeling the "best case"
scenario in terms of response times and saving human life.
Wanting to maximize the availability of data to be
collected, Monterey, California serves as the location for
the simulation scenario. The bus station in the heart of the
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city serves as the target at one of its busiest times of the
day - 1700 hours local time.
B. PARAMETERS
As mentioned above, the timelines for the model were
gathered from the Pacific Grove, CA exercise and current
chemical references defining response times for chemical
actions. Some parameters were determined by the author's
own personal measurements. For example, the average time
from the initial chemically contaminated area to the nearest
hospital is approximately five minutes in one direction.
This value was determined by actually timing how long it
took to drive the distance. The average mean density
population of the area for the model is 1,478 persons/ per
square kilometer. This value was derived by using the latest
census information and dividing the current population of
Monterey by the city's area in square kilometers
.
[Ref . 12]
This value determines the expected number of casualties per
a certain amount of sarin as the chemical spreads through
the area.
The average density population value is not the most
accurate number to use at the chemical release location.
This is because a terrorist would most probably want the
most populous area available to obtain high casualties.
Observing the target area for ten days at a random time
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between 1700-1800 hours, the average population at the bus
stop was 45 people. This count is also important in
determining the initial number of deaths because of sarin' s
quick dissemination property. The following lists the
parameter values used in the model.
• The effects of the chemical are displayed within 10
minutes
.
• 60% of the chemical released is disseminated in the
air, while 40% remains in liquid form.
• Total assets available within the first four hours
of the incident are: 15 fire engines, two HAZMAT
vehicles, six ambulances, seven police vehicles, one
medivac helicopter, and three buses [Ref. 7].
• Assets will be deployed to the scene in packages
called "Strike Teams" which include 16 fire fighters
and five fire engines per team.
• Strike teams are composed of the five most ready
vehicles closest to the scene.
• 55 firefighters are available within the four-hour
period.
• First ambulance, police, and fire vehicles arrive at
the scene within 4 minutes.
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• The one way travel time from the accident site to
Community Hospital of the Monterey Peninsula (CHOMP)
is 5 minutes.
• One way travel time from the accident site to
Nativadad Memorial Hospital (NMH) is 38 minutes.
• One way travel time from the accident site to
Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital (SVMH) is 28
minutes
.
• One way travel time from the accident site to
Watsonville Community Hospital (WCH) by helicopter
is 11 minutes [Ref . 7]
.
• Helicopter turn around time from the hospital to the
landing zone is 34 minutes [Ref. 7] .
• Helicopter refueling takes 16 minutes [Ref. 7].
• Triage rate is 30 seconds per minor injury, and one
minute per major injury [Ref. 7]
.
• 12 firefighters are needed to man and conduct the
decontamination site.
• The decontamination rate is 12 persons per hour, or
3 persons per 15 minutes [Ref. 8]
.
• Three patients can be loaded in an ambulance in 2
minutes [Ref . 7 ] .
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• Three patients can be unloaded from an ambulance in
4 minutes. Of the three patients, only two serious
victims can be transported at one time [Ref . 7]
.
• One minute is needed to restock the ambulance with
medical supplies [Ref. 7],
• Dead victims are ignored until all other casualties
are moved to the decon site.
• The average population at the bus stop is 45 people
at the time of the chemical attack.
• The average mean density population of the area for
the model is 1,478 persons/ per square kilometer.
• Ambulances hold 32 gallons of fuel with a
consumption rate of one gallon per hour stationary
and consume nine gallons per hour while moving.
• Fire trucks hold 60 gallons of fuel with a
consumption rate of eight gallons per hour
stationary and consume 12.5 gallons per hour while
moving
.
• Buses hold 90 gallons of fuel with a consumption
rate of five gallons per hour stationary and consume
15 gallons per hour while moving.
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• Police motorcycles hold eight gallons of fuel with a
consumption rate of .1 gallon per hour stationary
and consume 2 gallons per hour while moving.
• HAZMAT vehicles hold 42 gallons of fuel with a
consumption rate of .2 gallons per hour stationary
and consume five gallons per hour while moving.
• The medivac helicopter holds 362 gallons of fuel
with a consumption rate of 148 gallons per hour




An assumption is a factor that makes the simulation
viable reducing the human factor variability and other
unknown sources of error. The following is a list of the
assumptions made for this simulation.
• Ambulances travel the posted speed limit.
• All vehicles at h-hour are 100% full with fuel and
medical supplies.
• Ambulance routes provide the fastest times from the
accident location to the hospitals.
• Police can start initial triage but not perform on-
site treatment [Ref. 7].
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• Firefighters and ambulance personnel are equally
able to perform on-site treatment [Ref. 7].
• Because of breathing apparatus, only firefighters
can treat and move casualties until the patients
have been decontaminated.
• Enough atropine is available to treat all
casualties
.
• Additional transportation such as buses are
available to carry patients to hospitals if needed.
• The weather will not change after the chemical is
released.
• The area will be secured within one hour; hence
casualties will be assessed only by the mean
population density of the area.
• The HAZMAT team can determine the radius of the
chemical precisely.
• Water from the decontamination site is controlled
and does not cause any more contamination to the
area
.
• Victims showing more severe signs of the chemical
effects will receive decon first.
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• The chemical travels through the air at a rate of
2.79 meters per second. The wind speed for this rate
is a constant 5 kilometers per hour.[Ref. 9]
• The decontamination site will be as close as
possible to the incident location to expedite the
movement of the casualties.
• The first Strike team will arrive within 12 minutes
of the activation call.
• The second Strike team will arrive within 30 minutes
of the activation call.
• The third Strike team will arrive within 40 minutes
of the activation call.
• Firefighting vehicles will be used in the
contaminated area to gather casualties more quickly
in scenarios with 100 or more casualties.
• Firefighters and their equipment will not be
included in the total time of the operation (The
exercise is complete once the last casualty arrives
at the hospital)
.
• A second decon site will be established for an
incident involving 50 or more casualties.
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D. CREATING THE SIMULATION USING JANUS
1. Terrain
The simulation uses digitized terrain from the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to display elevation and
vegetation. Because of this, there were not any major
problems ensuring accuracy within this spectrum of the
simulation. The author did create the coastline and various
lakes within the area of operation. Figure 2 gives an
overview of the area to be modeled and also highlights the
major roads connecting the major hospitals in Salinas to the
Monterey Bay area. Appendix A, beginning on page 75 depicts






Figure 2 . Overview Map of the Modeled Area
"From Ref . [12]"
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Developing the road network was the next task to ensure
nhat movement of the simulation entities was accurate.
Entering Janus' Terrain Editor allows access to develop
roads for the simulation. Two road types were developed for
this exercise. The first represents the state Highway 1.
The second represents the state and local roads. The major
differences between the two roads are in the width and what
speed can be obtained on each. Janus not only allows the
modeler to determine such characteristics of the road
network as width and type of pavement, but also the maximum
speed that can be obtained while on that particular road.
This aspect is absolutely necessary in helping to identify
the times for casualty evacuation. For example an ambulance
can exceed speeds over 70 miles per hour, but because of
terrain, type of road or other constraints may be able to
only to go half its maximum speed.
2 . Urban Areas
To create the populated areas one remains in Janus'
Terrain Editor. Using a detailed map to determine the
general shape and layout of the city is the best tool
available. Janus also takes into effect the same movement
considerations within the built-up area as it does with
roads. This is a very desirable trait since creating roads
within the city can be a very tedious task. This allows the
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modeler to set established speed limits within the entire
city and not draw every street within the ciry. The icons
will move at the same speed within the city as they would on
a created road. The modeler can then focus efforts on
specific routes within the city to change speed restrictions
if so desired. The created routes are shown in Appendix A.
Another useful feature of Janus is the ability to set
line-of-sight parameters within the city. This allows the
user to adjust visibility within the city. This visibility
may be reduced because of buildings blocking the unit'
s
line-of-sight. This parameter depends on the height of
surrounding buildings and the number of buildings within a
particular area. Adding this feature with Janus' "closed"
property provides a realistic scenario where rescue workers
must search the contaminated area for casualties. Since we
are modeling the best case scenario, this aspect was not
investigated in detail in this simulation, but rather
mentioned for future study in replicating actual performance
or for exercises requiring decision-making by local leaders.
One could combine the above-mentioned features with Janus'
capability to model the effects on the individual in
protective gear. The effects of a decision to conduct a
detailed search of an area versus a quick search of the area
could be examined. The effects due to individuals being in
35
protective clothing is discussed in more detail in section
four of this chapter.
3. Creating Icons
Creating the individual entities and systems that are
used in the exercise is the most prominent role in
developing the simulation. The author feels this area is
where Janus is truly superior to other simulations. Having
the ability to monitor a particular unit or observe the
entire operation as it unfolds demonstrates valuable lessons
that would be missed in analyzing simple numbers from
simulation output.
Creating an entity requires one to establish certain
parameters within three different Janus tools. The first
simulation tool is called the Symbol Editor. This is where
the entity receives its cosmetic appearance. Most Janus
systems already have an icon developed within the Symbol
Editor, so by modifying some current systems it is fairly
easy to create figures such as helicopters and people. Using
r.he mouse-driven drawing commands, other particular icons
can be created such as fire engines and ambulances.
The key to modeling each entity accurately lies within
the second simulation tool used called Combat Systems
Database. Within this data structure, the general
characteristics of each entity are developed. The entity's
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maximum road speed, fuel consumption while stationary and
moving, are examples of the information inputted for each
system modeled. Other attributes that can effect the
simulation such as height, weight and the capability of a
vehicle to transport people can also be represented.
The last simulation tool, Force Definition, serves as
an organizing file to store all the created participants for
the simulation. This tool has features that make the model
easier to develop and more cosmetically pleasing to the eye.
The ability to define aggregates for each icon represented
makes viewing the exercise easier to follow. For example,
in this simulation, one person represents either 11 or 22
people. The large number of participants, each represented
by a single icon would clutter the view and hide more
interesting aspects of the simulation. This aggregation
appears to have no harmful effects. Also through Force
Definition, the model can easily add or delete units to
compare different scenarios and investigate the significance
of those differences. [Ref. 14]
4 . Miscellaneous Modeling Features in Janus
After the above mentioned simulation tools are used for
scenario development, the final parameters of the model are
inputted in the Janus Workstation Display. This screen is
the initial screen shown before the exercise begins. From
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this screen the modeler can deploy the icons to their
initial positions within the city. Icons can also be put
into chemical protection representing breathing apparatus
and protective clothing. The effect of this status is to
make the entities move slower and detect individuals with
less accuracy. [Ref. 6:p.51]
Developing the initial routes for the icons is also
made during this phase of the model. Figure 3 shows how
these routes are created within the simulation. The timed
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Figure 3. How an Entity Moves on a Route "After
Ref. [5]"
node allows the icon to stop at a certain point along the
route until the pre-determined time has elapsed. Using this
type of node, ambulance routes were developed from the
accident site to the various hospitals. This feature helps
in reducing variance inputted into the model. For example,
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the modeler may start a vehicle at one time during one
scenario, but forget to start the vehicle at the same time
in the next run of the simulation. This can result in
inaccurate data results. Using the time nodes, the modeler
will not have to worry about keeping track of when to start
and stop a vehicle, therefore variance from human error is
reduced.
Line-of-Sight (LOS) can also be measured for each
entity. This feature enhances the model's realism. Figure 4
depicts the LOS viewing fan of an entity. The modeler can
change the orientation and the width of the fan. Terrain
and buildings are taken into account by Janus' algorithm for
iine-of-sight . For example, the broken line in figure 4
shows where the unit's line-of-sight is obscured by terrain
or an urban feature.
Figure 4. Entity's Line-of-Sight "After Ref. [5]
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The final point discussed within this section is the
capability of the Janus model to view areas of interest in
the simulation that are not captured explicitly within the
terrain file. The Command and Control (CAC) menu allows the
modeler to add specific graphics to the main simulation
screen. This function is how the various chemical dispersion
patterns, hospital sites, and decon site are exhibited in
the model. The graphics are drawn using the mouse-driven
commands. In this manner the overlay of the chemical




E . MODELED SCENARIOS
Investigating the chemical attack size the modeled area
could effectively handle, using the aforementioned
parameters and assumptions, was one of the major interests
in this thesis. To develop a sensitivity analysis, three
different scenarios were created. The first scenario was
designed to establish a lower bound on the number of
casualties the system could properly manage within the first
four hours of the attack. In this scenario, 22 casualties
all receive a non-lethal dosage of sarin. The victims need
lo be decontaminated, and then evacuated to a hospital. The
intent of this plan was to develop and validate the
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parameters and assumptions of the model without over
stressing the resources available.
The next scenario was designed to stress the
available resources, and make full use of additional assets.
One hundred casualties receiving a chemical dosage between
8,000 mg-min/rrr to 1 mg-min/m 3
,
provided the stimulus.
Because the closest hospital to the site of the incident has
limited laboratory resources, respiratory equipment, and
physicians a patient rotation was developed. A patient
rotation is how emergency decision-makers decide the number
of victims that can be transported to the various hospitals
within the area that will provide support for the accident:.
The goal of the rotation is to not deplete any of the
supporting hospital's resources over the time required to
treat all the victims. Our modeled rotation corresponds to
the actual rotation that emergency responders would try to
establish for an actual crisis involving this number of
victims. The modeled rotation is two severe and three minor
patients between Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula
(CHOMP), Salinas Valley Memorial (SVMH) , and Natividad
Memorial (NMH) Hospitals. Severe is defined as a patient not
being stable after the antidote has been administered. Minor
is a stable victim, but one who has been exposed to enough
of the chemical to display symptoms. Once the severe victims
are evacuated, five minor patients can go in the rotation.
The emergency helicopter is used in this exercise to assist
the transportation of victims. The intent of the second
scenario was to present a situation where resources outside
the county would have to assist in the attack response
because available resources would be exhausted by the large
amount of victims.
The last scenario follows the scenario mentioned
above in concept, but the intent is to find the number of
casualties the system could withstand within the initial
four-hour period. This of course will be less than the
number of victims from scenario two. The total number of
assets used in the previous scenarios remain the same.
Casualties receive a chemical dosage between 8,000 mg-min/rrr
to 1 mg-min/m% the same as scenario two, but the exposed
area is reduced. By reducing the chemically exposed area we
expose fewer people. This has the same effect as a terrorist
releasing a smaller dosage of the chemical. The hospital
rotation remains the same as scenario two, and the emergency
helicopter still flies critical victims to hospitals outside
the county.
In summary, we have inputted all the parameters and
made sufficient assumptions to allow us to create our model.
When we run our simulation we can validate the model by
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checking the simulation data against our established
parameters from References 6 and 7. The three scenarios
developed also helped validate our model by providing a wide
range of data. We are now ready to collect the data and
answer the questions we set out to answer at the beginning
of this thesis which helps determine how local communities
can better prepare for and handle a chemical terrorist
attack.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS/ RESULTS
A. GRAPHICAL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
Before discussing the measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
used in this simulation, a graphical and statistical
analysis was conducted to see if the model's output followed
an identifiable type of probability distribution. Having
conducted a reconnaissance from the incident site to rhe
various hospitals, we compare our simulation times with the
times measured for travel to the different hospitals.
Wanting to acquire a wide range of simulation data points
for this parameter, we make our sample size as large as
possible. The author conducted ten simulation runs for each
scenario. Summing the number of hospital trips from all
scenarios gives us a large random sample size to analyze.
For example, the sample size for the number of hospital
trips to CHOMP for three scenarios was a total of 239 trips.
From this data we can determine simple probability values
such as the mean and variance of travel times to each
hospital. With these probability values available, we can
then explore our data graphically and numerically as
described by the following analysis. It should be noted that
analyzing numbers from the simulation is not the major point
of emphasis within this thesis. The most substantial work
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of this thesis was to develop an accurate model that local
agencies can use to prepare for a terrorist chemical attack.
Once the model is complete, examining the differences within
the simulation output is just one of the future areas of
work that could be studied in more depth.
Table 2 shows the summary of statistics for all four

















Samp 1 e s
CHOMP Amb 300 284.85 26.43 5.14 239
SVMH Amb 1680 1619.49 1366.76 36.97 130
NMH Amb 2280 2212.65 1124.96 33.54 60
WCH Helo 660 698.19 85.36 9.24 108
Table 2. Summary of Statistics for the Simulation
Because of the large sample sizes for each event, we should
expect the data to capture the nature of their underlying
distributions. Figures 5,6,7, and 8 graphically display the
results of each event. Each figure consists of four graphs
of the data for movement to each hospital. The first graph;
a histogram, gives a view of the distribution shape. The
second graph is a boxplot that gives a clear representation
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of the median (the solid white line inside the box), and the
upper and lower quartiles (the lower and upper ends of the
box) . Each point from the data, which occurs outside 1.5
times the interquartile range, is displayed as an outlier by
a single black horizontal line. The third graph is a density
plot, which is another version of the boxplot except
smoother. The density plot shows the probability that a
certain value within a particular interval is the area under
the curve. For illustration, one can think of the density
curves within this thesis as representing the distribution
of time. For example, the probability that the time will be
less than 300 seconds in figure 5 is the area under the
curve to the left of 300. The fourth graph on each page is
the quantile-quantile (qq) plot. The qq plot consists of a
plot of the ordered values of the data against the quantiles
of a "standard" normal distribution with mean zero and
variance one. [Ref . 15: p. 45] . One of the uses of the qq plot
is to compare an empirical distribution with a theoretical
distribution. In our case, we compare our data against the
normal distribution. If our data is similar to the normal
distribution the points from the data will closely lie along
the diagonal line which represents the normal distribution.
If the normal distribution does not fit our data the points
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Figure 5. Graphs of CHOMP Data "After Ref. [15]"
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Figure 8. Graphs of Helicopter Data "After Ref [15]
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Reviewing the graphs for each event we see each set of
data appears to follow the normal distribution as expected.
The density plots and the quantile-quantile plots for each
data set clearly shows this assumption. We do see some
variance in the qq plots at the tails of each data set and
the straight line representing the normal distribution. This
is expected, because most data sets fit more accurately in
the middle of the data sets than at the endpoints. This can
be explained by the sample size of the data set as seen in
figure 8. The smaller the sample size, the more samples are
required before the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) takes
effect. The CLT states, "that as the sample size (n)
increases the sampling distribution of the mean becomes
approximately normal, regardless of the variable's frequency
distribution. The sampling distribution will be centered
around the variable's population mean u, and the sample's
standard deviation approaches c/(n) 1/2 , the variable's
population standard deviation divided by the square root of
the sample size." [Ref. 17:p.27]. Because of this fact, we
need another way to conclude our data resembles the normal
distribution. This is accomplished by the Chi-squared
Goodness of Fit test. Each sample was compared to the normal
distribution with the mean and standard deviation taken from
each sample. The test provides a p-value. This value
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represents the probability that if the null hypothesis were
true that the test statistic would take a value as extreme
or more extreme than what is observed. The null hypothesis
we test is that the normal distribution fits the data versus
the alternate hypothesis that the standard distribution does
not model the data. Equation 1 shows the equation used for
computing the chi-squared statistic.
, ,.
(observed, - exp ected
l )
2
7" = Z i
exp ected
!
Equation 1. Chi-squared goodness -of -f it test
The chi-square statistic is determined by grouping the
number of observations into k groups. The observed counts
in each group are then compared to the expected counts from
the hypothesized distribution. In our case under the null
hypothesis that the sample comes from the normal
distribution, it has a x~ distribution with k-1 degrees of
freedom. For a predetermined significance level a (we will
use a = .05), we reject the null hypothesis if our p-value
is less than a. The results of the test are presented in
Table 3. Because our p-value is higher than any significant
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level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we
assume that the normal distribution fits our data.
SAMPLE X
2 STATISTIC DEGREES OF
FREEDOM
P-VALUE
CHOMP 8.10 15 0.9195
NMH 1.97 8 0.9820
SVMH 5.46 12 0.9408
HELICOPTER 10.22 11 0.5105
Table 3. Results of Chi-Squared Goodness of Fit Test for
Testing Samples Against the Normal Distribution
Realizing that in each ground transportation sample the
mean time is faster than the author's measured time, some
may question the measured time's accuracy. This perhaps can
be explained as we are modeling the "best case scenario", so
human intangibles are not modeled. We are not modeling the
effects of traffic or having to slow down at intersections.
Also, we cannot model the variance that different drivers
and vehicles would have on the mean time to each hospital.
The helicopter sample is different than the parameter time
defined in Reference 7 because actual flight routes and
speeds were not known for the simulation.
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B. CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
Confidence intervals were determined to find an
interval within which we are confident the true value of
each sample's mean lies with some degree of confidence.
Table 4 displays the 99% and 95% upper and lower confidence
limits for each sample's mean.












CHOMP 284.85 285.71 283.99 285.50 284 .20
SVMH 1619.11 1627.48 1610.75 1625.47 1612.76
NMH 2212.65 2223.82 2201.48 2221.14 2204.16
HELO 698. 19 700.48 695.90 699.93 696.45
Table 4. 99% and 95% Confidence Intervals in Seconds for
all Samples
The differences between the two confidence intervals brings
out one of the major advantages of simulation, the cost of
gathering data to achieve a certain level of accuracy within
the sample estimates. Collecting data reguires resources
such as man-hours and money to be expended. To gain an idea
of how much data needs to be conducted, analysts would like
to compute a sample size sufficient to guarantee a certain
level of statistical significance. Using the following




Equation 2. Determining required Sample Size
L represents a predetermined length (our case L = time in
seconds), required to ensure the error in estimating the
mean is less than a specified amount the analysts is willing
to accept.
This statistical concept brings out two major
advantages in using the concept of simulation to gather
data. The first is it gives the modeler a cheaper solution
to collecting the data besides having to spend enormous
amounts of time and funds to conduct the true experiment.
For example, Table 5 gives the required sample sizes for the
four transportation samples.









Table 5. Required Sample Size for Required Confidence
Interval
The sample sizes for SVMH, and NMH have a length L, of 10
seconds. Because Equation 2 is calculated using each
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sample's standard deviation, CHOMP and the HELO sample have
an L of 5 seconds. Table 5 shows the vast difference in the
confidence intervals' sample size. The smaller the desired
length L, the larger the sample size must be. This means
more resources spent to acquire the desired result. Another
point of interest is looking at the confidence intervals in
Table 4 one will see that the answer to which confidence
interval to use is a difficult question to answer. Is it
better to use a smaller sample size, or use more resources
to gather a larger sample size that has more accuracy? This
question is difficult to answer because the higher the
desired degree of confidence, the longer the interval. If
one thinks of the interval in terms of precision, a
dependable interval may be inaccurate if the endpoints are
far apart. The gain in having a larger interval means a loss
in accuracy. [Ref. 16: p. 281] The second major advantage of
using the simulation concept is it gives a modeler a better
feel for data obtained from an experiment. In most cases
experimentation is only one valid trial at a time.
Simulation can provide more information in less time because
more simulations can be conducted within a certain time. The
attentive data collector can then more clearly see patterns
developing in the data that may go undiscovered if not for
the repetition of conducting the simulation.
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C. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)
1 . MOE 1 ( Rate of people treated/ time of the entire
process)
MOE 1 was developed to determine the rate at which a
person is treated for the entire evacuation process. The
rate at which people are treated is very important to study
for many reasons. The first reason is budget constraints.
Communities have limited transportation assets and can only
have a certain number of first responders able to react
immediately to an incident because of budget limitations.
Also, hospitals can only treat a limited number of victims
within a certain time before their resources are consumed.
By examining our data we can establish the treatment rate
for our scenario. The modeler can then study the effects if
more ambulances are used or other hospitals are used in the
scenario. We can also see the effects if fewer assets are
available. For example, two ambulances have maintenance
problems and are unable to participate in the exercise.
Studying the data, we find MOE 1 depends on three times: the
time required to collect and initially treat victims, the
time required to decon victims, and finally the times needed
to transport victims to the various hospitals. Table 6


















1 .1131 8 195 22
2 .2588 11 2 2 255 66
3 .2932 17 3 4 341 100
Table 6. Critical values for MOE 1
Analyzing MOE 1, two interesting results are
discovered. The first point of interest is that the maximum
number of victims that can be managed within the initial
four-hour period is approximately 66. Using the same
resources for all three scenarios we find that it would take
approximately 341 minutes (5 hours and 41 minutes) to treat
100 casualties. The second point of interest is within the
MOE rate of the three scenarios. One would expect the second
and third scenario to have a higher rate than the first
because of the extra decon site established in scenarios two
and three. The difference between scenario two and three
lies within the number of bus evacuations. What the extra
bus evacuation means to the simulation is that, if the decon
site can afford to have victims wait to be transported to
hospitals in groups, it is faster than moving victims by
ambulance. In other words, there is no time lost by making
victims who are able to wait to travel in a group of 12 or
15 rather than not waiting and moving by threes in
ambulances. The actual difference between the two scenarios
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is 2 persons per hour in favor of the extra bus
transportation. We know the model accurately models the
distances to the different hospitals as mentioned earlier in
this chapter. We also have determined the MOE increases by
transporting more victims together than in groups of three
as displayed in the difference in MOE 1 between scenarios 2
and 3. From examining these conclusions we determine that,
if we really want to increase our rate for MOE 1, we must
have the assets available to establish at least two decon
sites. Hence, the increase in MOE 1 between scenario 1 and
2.
2 . MOE 2 (Number of victims that die/ Total number of
people evacuated)
This MOE is important because we would like to know
what could be done to minimize the number of deaths. As
discussed in earlier chapters, the chemical will have
dissipated within the first four hours of the attack, so any
advantage the first responders can gain to save time will in
turn save lives. The second MOE parallels the first, but is
more subjective. The reason for this subjectivity is due to
the manner in which the body reacts to chemicals as
discussed in Chapter II. We also analyze the HPAC graphs and
use the predicted victims for various concentration levels
of the chemical to make our estimate. Table 7 depicts the











1 22 1 .04 55
2 66 2 1 .0455
3 100 A1 3 .07
Table 7. Critical Data for MOE 2
The column- tit led "number of victims that die initially"
refers to victims exposed to the initial burst of the
chemical and die within the first 15 minutes of the
exposure. Even though the numbers may vary based on the
discussion from Chapter II, this MOE brings out four points
of interest. The first deals with the first emergency
responders that respond to the accident. If these units have
the equipment and training to identify and treat victims
within the first minutes of the incident, lives will be
saved. The second is the importance of having atropine
available as soon as possible. If the drug was carried in
small amounts by firefighters, the five victims that died
within the total three scenarios before being deconed may
have survived. The third is the importance of the HAZMAT
team being able to determine the contaminated area and what
type of chemical was released as quickly as possible. This
will help focus the limited resources that are available
within the first hour of the attack.
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Lastly, one might wonder why the value for MOE 2 is the
same for the first and second scenarios. The reason is
because the author assumed a linear relationship between
response packages. Recall from Chapter III that for an
incident involving 50 or more casualties, two decon sites
were established, while an incident involving less than 50
victims only one decon site was established. Because of the
additional decon site the rate the model is able to handle
casualties increases with the increase in victims. We see
degradation in the rate from the lack of resources in
scenario three. Notice that in scenario three the rate of
death per total number of people evacuated is almost double
the value for scenarios one and two. This shows the stress
put on the system by the large number of victims and no
change in the resources available.
3. MOE 3 ( Average amount of time required to
evacuate a casualty to the decon site )
The final MOE is significant because it analyzes one of
the critical times from our study of the first MOE.
Dividing the critical times into smaller intervals may lead
to more important findings. The third MOE combines the
parameters from Chapter III with what we found from the
simulation. MOE 3 is a combination of the response times to
treat a victim and the time reguired for the casualties to
walk in a group to the decon site. If a victim cannot walk,
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four firefighters are required to move the victim by
stretcher to the decon site. Figure 9 depicts the number of
firefighters able to assist in the collection and treatment
of the victims over time. Recall from Chapter III that the
firefighters will arrive at the scene of the attack in
"strike teams" consisting of 16 men and 5 fire engines.
Also, a maximum of three strike teams will be able to
participate within the first four hours of the incident. The
graph only shows firefighters that can aid in the collection
of victims. The 12 members needed to establish each decon
site are not included. The x-axis is in minutes after Pi-
hour .
35 40 45 50
minutes
55 60 65
Figure 9. Firefighters Available to Collect and Treat
Victims Versus Time
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Because we have modeled the "best case scenario" the times
are less than expected. Also, the times would be increased
if we would have incorporated Janus' "closed system" and the
firefighters would have to conduct a vigorous search for
victims before treatment is available. Table 8 displays the
data collected for MOE 3. Table 8 shows the number of
victims collected and initially treated per each group
movement to the decon site. For example, in the first
scenario all victims were moved in one group to the decon
site. In the second scenario, it took the available
firefighters three collections to move all 66 victims to the
decon site. The third scenario took five collections to move
all 100 victims to the decon site. The reason for the
increase in the number of movements is based on three
obvious factors:
• The number of victims increases in each scenario.
• The difference in the category of the victim
(serious or minor) and the number of each category
of victim.
• The number of firefighters available at various

















22 18 min 8/8 1.22
p 1 serious
20 minor
21 18 min 8/8 1.17
2 16 minor 37 20 min 8/8 .800
2 19 minor 66 15 min 12/12 1.27
3 1 serious
20 minor
21 18 min 8/6 1 . 17
3 1 serious
12 minor
34 21 min 8/7 . 619
3 1 serious
21 minor
56 21 min 12/12 1.0 5
3 22 minor 78 1 8 min 31/31 1.22
3 22 minor 100 13 min 31/31 1.62
Table 8. Collected Data for MOE 3
The average time it took to transport a seriously injured
victim by litter or for a group of minor injured victims to
walk to the decon site was 12 minutes. Summing all the
calculated data for MOE 3, we produced an average MOE value
for the entire simulation of 1.13 victims per minute.
Analyzing the averaged MOE, the averaged value makes sense.
As expected the rate increases, as more firefighters are
able to assist. Also, the rate is severely hindered by the
movement of one serious victim because it takes four
firefighters to move one seriously injured casualty by
litter as mentioned in Chapter three. Also, we must remember
that one firefighter must stay with one critically injured
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victim during the entire evacuation procedure. This is why
in the column tilted 'Firemen Available/Used" not all
firemen appear to assist in the evacuation, because they are
assisting a critical patient. Lastly, we notice the major
constraint on this MOE is the foot speed of the victims
themselves. For example the fourth entry in Table 8 has 12
firefighters available for 19 minor casualties, but because
of collection and the walking speed of the victims it takes
the group 15 minutes to reach the decon site.
Analyzing the data, we can make some very important
observations. The first is that our data displayed the
characteristics of the normal probability distribution, as
we expected prior to the simulation. This helps validate
the time from the site of the chemical attack to the various
hospitals. The second observation is that we have explored
three MOEs that answered the proposed questions we had
before we started the modeling process. Table 9 captures the
three MOEs for the three scenarios. From Table 9, we get a
quantification of adding assets to the model. The numerical
MOE values are not what we should focus our analysis on,
these values will change depending on human factors or
assumptions that our simulation can not model. Our focus
should be on where does our resourced response to the
incident improve. For example, we saw the rate at which
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victims die versus total number cf victims evacuated
decrease by approximately a factor of two when the second
decon site was added to the simulation.
SCENARIO / MOE 1. MOE 2 . MOE 3.
Total number Rate of people Number of Average amount
of victims treated/Time victims that of time
of the entire die/Total required to
process number of evacuate a
people casualty to
evacuated the decon site
( People/Mi n) (Victims/Min)
1/22 .1131 .0455 1.22
2/66 .2588 .0455 1.08
3 / 100 .2932 .07 1. 14
Table 9. Summary of Calculated MOE Values
In summary, we have shown that we can use our data and
model to see where additional assets could improve the
evacuation process. This analysis has led to some very
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this thesis was to develop a high-
resolution model that could effectively aid local
governments in crisis management. This objective was met by
accomplishing two tasks. We created a simulation that has
newly established local response entities like ambulances,
fire apparatus and HAZMAT teams that can be used for future
simulations. We also have created a terrain file that
replicates the Monterey Peninsula and the surrounding area.
Both of these major accomplishments now make modeling
civilian and military operations within the area
encompassing the Monterey Peninsula more accurate and user
friendly. Secondly, we accomplished our objective by
utilizing Janus to develop three simulation scenarios, using
established parameters from previously executed crisis
exercises. These scenarios were used to conduct a
sensitivity analysis on the maximum number of victims that
the local agency's resources could manage. The three
scenarios consisted of 22, 66, 100 victims respectively. We
also detected and analyzed the times it took to move victims
from the chemical site to various hospitals. Lastly, we
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discovered a rate it took to move casualties to the decon
site under chemical conditions.
The major concern of this study was development of the
model, and then to find the upper limit on the number of
victims the system could effectively treat within the first
four hours of the chemical attack. We found this upper bound
to be approximately 66 victims. The major constraints in
the various scenarios were the time it took to decon the
personnel, and the number of available firefighters to
collect and assist the chemically contaminated victims.
Finally, the model appears to replicate the parameters and
assumptions from Reference 7. We cannot be totally sure we
have 100% accuracy within the model since the exercise in
Reference 7 did not include chemical play. One must remember
that a model is just that; a model, and a change in the




This high-resolution model has enormous potential to
significantly contribute to the training and study of
terrorist chemical attacks in urban areas. Awareness and
training within the general public is the best
recommendation one can possibly give on this subject. If
citizens believe that it will never happen, when it does it
will be too late. Sadly, this recommendation will never be
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satisfied to the extent that it needs to be. The most
important contribution the model could make is to provide an
inexpensive tool for first responders to practice their
decision-making skills. Using the model to develop actual
scenarios to train community response agencies on, or before
an exercise is executed would develop valuable experience.
The author learned from conducting the simulation how
important the communication structure must be within the
local response network. This can also be readily shown in
the model. Having individuals from different organizations
participate in a simulation exercise force each organization
to ensure the other members of the crisis action team
understand that the decisions they make, or do not make,
will effect the entire crisis management plan. Decisions
like ambulance management and rotation of patients to
various hospitals are easily integrated within the model.
Learning how much and which type of equipment saves more
lives is just another aspect that could result from model
use
.
From the scenarios used for this study, we provide
several specific recommendations for local agency
preparedness. Because of the quick absorption of nerve
chemicals it would be wise for firefighters to carry a small
amount of the antidote with them while collecting victims.
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This will hopefully stabilize more severe victims until they
can be transported to the decon site. Having equipment on-
hand that will allow for the quickest determination of the
radius of the chemical spread and what type of chemical was
released also will expedite the process. Giving policemen
and emergency medical technicians some sort of protective
equipment will not only accelerate casualty processing, but
also protect these people since they will most likely at
first be responding to a murky situation. Setting up as many
decon sites, as possible will also quicken the operation
since decontamination is a time consuming process.
From the data, we also learned that it was not
necessarily waiting for transportation that was a major
concern for non-critical victims. It was the number of
firefighters available to set-up and man the decon site, and
also collect and move casualties. Having more firefighters
available would help this problem, or as mentioned above,
more people with breathing apparatus. Lastly, a logical
recommendation, but one that is outside the study of this
thesis is having more physicians and equipment available at
the hospitals would also reduce the overall time of the
operation
.
In closing, unfortunately many of the recommendations
mentioned cost money. Using this model gives the community a
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cost-effective method to develop and study this type of
event. The savings in training cost that the model provides
could allow much needed equipment and personnel to be added
to the community's resources. A major use of the model would
be to continue to mature vital decision-making skills. These
decision-making skills will save human life in the event of
a terrorist chemical attack.
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APPENDIX A. SCENARIO IMAGES
Selected images from the simulation appear in this
appendix. The figures are grouped into four categories.
The four groups are: General, Scenario 1, Scenario 2, and
Scenario 3. A brief explanation of each picture is listed




Overview of the modeled area
Figure A2 Enlarged view of the modeled area
Figure A3: Satellite imagery of the chemical target site
Figure A4 Enlarged satellite of the chemical target
site
Figure A5 Pictures of the bus stop
Figure A6 Modeled entities' icons
Scenario 1
Figure A7 : View of area at H+4 minutes
Figure A8 : Ambulance enroute to CHOMP
Figure A9 : Victims unloaded at CHOMP
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Scenario 2
Figure A10: Victims moving to decon site
Figure All: Ambulance enroute to SVMH
Figure A12: Victims loaded into ambulance
Scenario 3
Figure A13: Helicopter loading victims
Figure A14: Helicopter refueling
Figure A15: Bus enroute to NMH
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Figure Al . Overview of Modeled Area
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Figure A2 . Enlarged View of the Modeled Area





Figure A4 . Enlarged Satellite View of the Target Area
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Figure A6 . Modeled Entities' Icons
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Figure A8 . Ambulance Enroute to CHOMP
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Unit System l/H Host Of I Fuel Ve lo Dlay Hid Sup Bre Chen
27 APIS 1 1 -1 Exp 93 50.0
5 BSL017 1111 27
Unit 27 has OISPIQUNTED units
Figure A9 . Victims Unloaded at CHOMP
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Figure AlO . Victims Moving to Decon Site
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Figure A14. Helicopter Refueling
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Figure A15 . Bus Enroute to NMH
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APPENDIX B. REVIEW OF MODEL
Dr. Russell C. Coile, Disaster Coordinator/Emergency
Program Manager of Pacific Grove, California provided the
author with the following comments about the simulation and
the conclusions and recommendations of this thesis after
reviewing the model on May 27, 1999.
1. Scenario Overview - page 13. The estimated values
in Table 1 seem reasonable considering the assumption of
"ideal performance". It should be realized that putting on
and wearing HAZMAT Level A protection suits might slow all
operations down.
2. Contaminated area - "For this simulation the
contaminated area is known precisely (page 16) . In actual
operations, the Fire Department's HAZMAT team will use an
unclassified plume prediction computer program called
"Cameo" which may not be as accurate as the HPAC program.
Dr. Coile does not know how long it would take the HAZMAT
team to get meteorological data and run the Cameo program.
3. Parameters - page 26. Estimated parameters seem
reasonable. However, a number of actual factors might
degrade these estimates. For example, travel times to
hospitals may be longer if people hear the radio about
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"terrorists" and traffic j ams build up. There was a classic
case in Richmond, California a few years ago when 22,000
people stormed hospitals trying to get into the emergency
rooms after a chemical accident. (Approximately 57 people
were actually hospitalized.) Also, decontamination may take
longer than estimated. More firefighters may be required to
relieve the initial ones suited up in HAZMAT gear, etc.
4. Assumptions - page 30. Seem reasonable, but similar
cautions about the optimism should be raised.
5. Simulation - page 33. The Janus model with
digitized terrain and icons gives an excellent graphical
representation of the events.
6. Graphical and statistical analysis of data - page
45. The measures of effectiveness and results seem
sensible
.
7. Conclusions and recommendations - page 69. The
conclusions and recommendations seem appropriate and
supported by the data and analysis.
8. Overall comment. The model seems excellent. The
Pacific Grove Fire Department is looking forward to an
opportunity in the future to use the model to explore
various factors which might result in more effective local
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